Would it actually be the worst thing if China filled gaps left by US foreign aid?

The most immediate reaction of strategists and geopolitical analysts, in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere, has been a reversion to a ritual: what about China?

Will it swan in with fistfuls of cash to supplant carefully curated American influence?

I've got both good and bad news: no.

China isn't likely to suddenly stump up anything close to the billions of dollars that America was providing.

More to the point - if they did, would that be the worst thing?

China doesn't report its foreign aid activities like traditional donors, but several China aid tracking databases (including the Lowy Institute's) show a collapse in Chinese spending since 2017.

In south-east Asia, for example, Chinese development and humanitarian support plunged from US$10 billion in 2017 to US$3 billion in 2022. In the Pacific, a 2016 high of US$412 million fell to US$256 million in 2022.

And China's general domestic economic malaise serves to indicate a distinct lack of any additional firepower to be brought to bear.

What does that mean for foreign influence and superpower competition in the Indo-Pacific?

The US aid freeze will of course have disastrous ramifications for the reputation of the erstwhile leader of the free world, and that will reflect poorly not only on Washington but all its allies and partners, including Australia, who claim to uphold a fair and just rules-based order.

But with the United States shooting itself in the foot and China dragging its feet, that's not the biggest problem.

The US has done the heavy lifting globally on stemming pandemics, especially HIV and Ebola; funding counter-terrorism and peace-building efforts; combatting human and drug trafficking; and propping up civil society and free media amid democratic backsliding.

Most of that vital work, addressing critical threats that would otherwise spill across borders, has been grant-funded.

And without it, the very real and direct risks to the rest of the globe - including Australia - are even more pressing.

In the Indo-Pacific, other donors could also step up. But the signs aren't promising. Australia's aid levels haven't been this low since 2008.

Sweden has withdrawn entirely from several countries, and other European countries have slashed aid budgets - by 25 per cent for Belgium, and by more than 1 billion euros (about A$1.65 million) each for France and Germany. Japan is the brightest beacon of hope - but spent less in south-east Asia in 2022, inflation-adjusted, than in 2015.

Even if they could cumulatively scrape together the money to replace the US, it's harder and less efficient to co-ordinate a spread of smaller donors than to have fewer, bigger, more coherent aid programs. It's not a neat substitute for the leadership, consistency and sheer volume that the US was known for.

MORE OPINION:

The worst-case scenario is not that China takes this opportunity - it's that they don't.

A funding gulf in the developing Indo-Pacific to combat pathogens, organised crime and other transnational threats is an exponentially more urgent risk to Australia.

Historically, China has had a very different approach, focusing on loans for hard infrastructure.

It would be a big and difficult pivot to imitate the US program. But if China does step in to fill the gap left by the US, good. US-funded programs to clear landmines in Cambodia, worth US$10 million annually, have been abruptly halted.

But others have stepped in - Japan announced US$1.3 million, Australia announced US$1.24 million, and China is providing a US$4.4 million grant. How can that be a bad thing?

There is valid criticism of China's aid - I've written some of it myself. But more grants for global public goods should be seen as a good thing for everyone, no matter who it comes from.